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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Introduction and Background of the Problem
On 22 June 1999 in his first speech as the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki outlined a direction for the United States Army that promised to bring change to the Army during the transition between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This transformation envisioned by General Shinseki was one that would take the Army from a heavy, tank-based force of the Cold War toward a lighter, more deployable force ready to face the next unknown war and the challenges of the coming century. On 11 September2001, the homeland of those United States military forces deployed abroad in an attempt to deter enemies, came under attack by terrorist forces from who successfully hijacked four civil U.S. passenger airliners, flying one airliner into each of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City; a third airliner into the military headquarters of the United States at the Pentagon, just outside of the nation’s capital; and the fourth airliner fell into a remote field in Pennsylvania as the hijackers were overcome by the passengers aboard the doomed plane (United States Government 2004, 1-14). The unknown “next war” had arrived, and the changes to the Army directed by General Shinseki prior to the tragic events of 11 September 2001 were about to be tested. One of the critical components of these changes included specific guidance to develop systems that would allow the battlefield commander to be able to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively (Shinseki 2001). This study will examine the efficacy of transforming from the decision-making doctrine and processes of the Army prior to General Shinseki’s nudge toward a changing force and is now available to  
commanders and their staffs with the population of networked digital battle command systems into the tactical decision making centers of the Army.
简介和背景
埃里克•K•辛塞基将军(第34任美国陆军参谋总长,日裔,1999-2003)在1999年6月22日新任陆军参谋总长的第一次演讲中,概述了美军的发展方向,他承诺,将在20世纪与21世纪之交给美军带来新的改革。辛塞基将军所展望的改革将把陆军从冷战期间重型为主的力量转变为更加轻型机动的一支力量,以便面对下一场未知的战争和下个世纪的挑战。2001年9月11日,远赴境外阻止外敌的美军,其本土竟然遭到恐怖分子的袭击。恐怖分子成功劫持了4架美国客机,各有一架分别飞向了纽约世贸中心的双子楼;第三架飞向了美军的军事总部五角大楼,临近首都华盛顿;第四架坠毁在宾夕法尼亚州一个偏僻的牧场,因为劫机者被搭乘这趟“死亡航班”的乘客们制服了(联邦政府,2001,1-14)。未知的“下一场战争”已经到来,并且辛塞基将军在911惨剧之前推行的军队改革即将验证。这项改革的关键之一包括具体指导开发一个旨在使战场指挥员能够首先看到、首先理解、首先行动并果断结束的系统(辛塞基,2001)。这项研究将会检验在辛塞基将军推行改革之前军队决策从教程到程序转换的效能,而且对网络数字化战场指挥系统群的指挥官和参谋们在陆军战术决策中心中十分有益。
Several experiments directed toward sharing information between tactical operations centers (TOC) were initiated prior to General Shinseki’s selection to serve as the 34th Chief of Staff of the Army. Most notably, the Army’s 4th Infantry Division (4ID) home based at Fort Hood, Texas, served as the test bed unit for digitizing the Army from divisional headquarters elements down to individual fighting platforms that included tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. The suite of digital systems developed to network and interlink the various echelons of the 4ID evolved into the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). ABCS is a system of systems that serves to provide information and a common operational picture (COP) to the commanders at various echelons in the digitized force.
关于战术行动中心之间共享信息的几项实验在辛塞基将军当选第34任陆军参谋总长之前就已经开始着手了。显而易见,驻于德克萨斯胡德堡的陆军第四步兵师,成为了将陆军从师指挥部建制数字化为独立的包括了坦克、装甲运兵车和炮兵的作战平台的试验台。这套开发用于网络联系第四步兵师各梯队的数字系统逐渐发展成为了陆军战场指挥系统(简称ABCS)。陆军战场指挥系统(ABCS)其实是一个向数字化部队各梯队指挥员提供信息和公共操作画面(COP)的系统群。
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to look at those digital battle command system processes and the Army’s doctrinal decision-making process to determine if the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) found in the Army’s recently approved Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, dated 20 January 2005, remains valid. FM 5-0 is the capstone doctrinal source for the conduct of the MDMP, “a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action [COA], and producing a plan or order,” applicable across the full spectrum and range of military operations (FM 5-0 2005, 3-1). FM 5-0 used in conjunction with FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 6-0, Command and Control, serve as the
basic references for leaders to exercise decision making, planning, and employment of operational and tactical formations.
目的
本研究的目的在于审视这些数字战场指挥系统进程和陆军教条的决策进程以便决定在陆军近期核准的战场手册FM 5-0(军事计划和命令的产生,2005年1月20日)中建立的军事决策程序(简称MDMP)是否依然有效。FM 5-0是军事决策程序(MDMP)实施的学术起源,“一个建立了旨在任务分析,发展,分析并参照彼此成功原则比较行动方案,选择最佳行动方案,产生计划或者命令一系列步骤的规划模型”,适用范围跨越全部军事行动(FM 5-0 2005, 3-1)。FM 5-0与FM 3-0(作战行动)FM 6-0(命令与控制)结合使用,成为了领导者练习决策、计划、作战部署和战术编队的基本参考。
Research Questions
The primary research question guiding this study is: Do ABCS functions and capabilities parallel the steps and processes doctrinally outlined and required through the MDMP? The secondary questions that must be addressed in order to answer the primary question are:
1. What function does ABCS serve in relation to MDMP?
2. What are the doctrinal steps to the MDMP as outlined in FM 5-0 that apply to ABCS?
3. What is the primary digital system providing the commander a COP?
4. How does the ABCS suite achieve interconnectivity, with specific focus on the Maneuver Control System (MCS), important to military decision-making processes?
5. What are the functions that MCS and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) are designed to replicate or perform directly related to the MDMP?
6. What are the linkages to the targeting and fire support systems for ABCS (AFATDS) that are important to MDMP?
7. What other integration or decision-making process and alternatives to MDMP are available that may gain efficiencies in decision making and staff operations now enabled by the functionality of the digital ABCS components?  
研究的问题
导引本课题的首要研究问题是:在军事决策程序中,陆军战场指挥系统的功能和能力与教程所述必需的步骤和程序是并行的吗?为了回答上述问题,其次需要搞清的问题包括:
1、陆军战场指挥系统(ABCS)在与军事决策程序(MDMP)中发挥什么功能?
2、FM 5-0中概述的用于陆军战场指挥系统的军事决策程序教程的步骤是什么?
3、为指挥员提供公共操作画面的主要数字系统是什么?
4、着眼于机动控制系统(MCS)并实现互联的陆军战场指挥配套系统对军事决策程序有多重要?
5、机动控制系统(MCS)和高级野战炮兵战术数据系统(AFATDS)设计用于复制或者履行与军事决策程序直接相关的何种功能?
6、陆军战场指挥系统ABCS (或者高级野战炮兵战术数据系统AFATDS)的瞄准和火力支援系统在对军事决策程序(MDMP)的重要性上有什么联系?
7、有何其他的合成或决策程序和方案可供MDMP使用,以便在决策中获得更高效率、在参谋作业中更好利用数字陆军战场指挥系统组件的功能性?
Assumptions
Integrated ABCS components are individual data processing systems linked together over a network designed to provide situational awareness and the COP commanders and staffs at strategic, operational, and tactical operating environments must have to gain the most complete perspective that decision making commanders at those echelons of battle command require. Leveraging technological advances in command communication control computers intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, commanders and staffs must still use some process to analyze information and prepare orders for the execution of military action across battlefield functional areas and over a wide spectrum of contemporary operating environments (COEs). A key assumption is that the MDMP and the C4ISR tools available in the ABCS suite of systems must be integrated in order to achieve the most efficient means to produce timely, actionable orders for subordinate commanders and units. Advances in technology have transformed the tools commanders and staffs use to collect and analyze data, compare objective courses of action, and apply solutions to complex military operations. The most efficient means to produce actionable orders with clearly understandable objectives based on the most relevant information available as required by commanders and staffs to make decisions is found in doctrine as defined by United States Army FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005.
假设
集成的陆军战场指挥系统组件是通过用于提供战场态势和公共操作画面(COP)的网络连接在一起的一些独立的数据处理系统。处于战略、行动和战术操作环境下的指挥员和参谋们必须获得在此作战指挥阶层的决策指挥员所需求的最透彻的理解。虽然C4ISR系统的技术力量大大进步,在整个战场功能区和大范围的实时操作环境,指挥员和参谋们仍然必须依靠一些程序来分析信息并准备执行军事行动的指令。关键性的假设在于,在陆军战场指挥配套系统中可用的军事决策程序MDMP和C4ISR工具,必须是一体化集成的,以便以最高的效率向下级指挥员和单位发出实时有效的命令。技术的进步已经使指挥员和参谋们能够运用这些工具收集和分析数据、比较行动的客观性以及找到复杂军事行动的解决方案。依据指挥员和参谋们决策所需的相关资料发出目的明确的有效指令的最佳途径,在教程中已有提及:FM 5-0,军事计划与命令产生,2005年1月20日。
Assuming that the premise behind the MDMP is to get commanders and their staffs (often a mix of military professionals of varied expertise in the staff planning process) to “organize planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders” (FM 5-0 2005, 3-1),it  
is also assumed that those plans and orders must be translated and transmitted across the digital battle command systems that are networked to provide members of the command a common operation picture of the operational and tactical environment.
如果军事决策程序MDMP前提是使指挥员和参谋们(通常由各种专业的参谋计划程序专家组成)“组织策划活动,探讨对任务和上级意图的理解,并得出有效的计划和命令(FM 5-0 2005, 3-1)”,那么同样需要假设这些计划和命令必须通过数字战场指挥系统网络翻译和传送,以便给其他指挥员提供行动和战术环境下的公共操作画面。
Assuming that a requirement to change the method of battle command from one of acetate graphics and paper maps, and the decision-making processes associated with those tools is the crux of this thesis argument. Although the Army continues to work toward the Objective Force General Shinseki set the course for in his 1999 speech, the significant events of 11 September 2001 created a new set of challenges for the transforming Army. The United States responded to the terrorist attacks with deployment of forces and combat in Afghanistan in late 2001 through the present. In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched into Iraq by ground forces staged in Kuwait to institute a regime change of Saddam Hussein. The new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker, after careful consideration and assessment of the Army’s readiness and posture to defend the United States, made a decision to equally distribute the precious digital battle command system capabilities inherent to the 4ID to all units throughout the Army.
假设这个论题论证的核心是改变战场指挥依靠塑料尺和纸地图的需求,以及与这些工具相关的决策程序。虽然陆军继续为辛塞基将军在他1999年讲话中提出的建设目标部队的进程努力,2001年“9.11”事件对陆军的改革提出了新的挑战。当前,美国以部队部署和2001年底的阿富汗战争来回应恐怖袭击。2003年3月,地面部队取道科威特启动了“伊拉克自由行动”着手进行萨达姆•侯赛因政权的更替。新任陆军参谋总长皮特•J•舒马赫将军在慎重估量陆军战备情况之后,决定把专属第四步兵师的昂贵的陆军战场指挥系统同等地配发到全军各单位。
FM 5-0 recognizes that “modern information systems, coupled with information management, give commanders the capability of developing and disseminating a common operational picture (COP), a shared situational understanding that, in turn, speeds planning and decision making” (FM 5-0 2005, 1-27). The experience borne out of combat had proved that not just 4ID and the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams needed the digital connectivity to conduct effective battle command that had been initiated to serve as a bridge from the “analog” force to the digital Objective Force design.
         FM-50指出:“现代信息系统外加信息管理,使指挥员能够广播公共操作画面、共享态势理解,以此加快作战计划和决策” (FM 5-0 2005, 1-27)。战场经验已经证实,第四步兵师和“史崔克战斗旅(以M1126斯瑞克装甲战车中心的战斗旅)”需要数字联络来组织有效的战场指挥,这种数字联络最初设计作为模拟化部队到数字化目标部队的桥梁。

As technology advances, those tools available to the commander and his staff become critical to achieving solutions and producing orders that subordinate commanders and units expect to receive to accomplish a defined objective in order to perform their unique mission. The goal of this research is to analyze the relevance of the ABCS to the MDMP. Additionally, it is assumed that the application and employment of those decision-making tools by commanders and staffs continues to seek the most efficient means of gleaning the most relevant information from the right agent across battlefield functional areas in order to affect the most positive outcome for joint, interagency, and multinational military operations.
随着技术的进步,这些指挥员和参谋们应用的工具逐渐成为了找出解决方案和产生指令的关键,下级指挥员和单位就靠这些指令来完成规定目标并履行他们各自的任务。这项研究的目标就是分析陆军战场指挥系统ABCS和军事决策程序MDMP之间的关联。另外,假设指挥员和参谋们关于决策工具的申请和使用仍在寻找在战场功能区正确的因素中收集最适用资料的最有效途径,以便在联合、交互和多国军事行动中得到最积极的结果。
Understanding that decision makers will be immersed in an information centric environment where strategic, operational, and tactical command centers rely upon the ever-increasing flow of information, the MDMP may not be the most efficient decision making means available to commanders. The structure and validity of the MDMP must also be examined as the metric to which optional decision-making processes are compared. The relevance of MDMP, as it is doctrinally defined in both long and abbreviated form, is subject to study regarding applicability, feasibility, and usefulness in the current operating environment now populated by such a wide range of information management systems emplaced to assist commanders with battle command and decision making. The MDMP found in FM 5-0 may require refinement, adjustment, or replacement in order to continue meeting the likely decision cycle needs of commanders engaged in combat with enemies of the United States now and those likely to emerge in the future.  
既然决策者们将陷入战略、行动和战术指挥中心依赖于不断增长的信息流量的以信息为中心的环境,军事决策程序MDMP可能不会是指挥员们最有效的决策方法。军事决策程序MDMP的结构和有效性同样要作为可选的决策程序相对比的衡量标准来检验。军事决策程序MDMP的联系,不论学术定义形式长短,从属于研究关于在当前操作环境下的适用性、可行性和实用性,此操作环境由用于协助指挥员战场指挥和决策的大范围的信息管理系统组成。
Definition of Key Terms
关键词定义
Army Battle Command System (ABCS). A system of systems that are the body of digital C4I systems that automate the emerging digital force (Department of the Army 2005c)
         陆军战场指挥系统(ABCS):新兴的数字化部队实现自动化的数字C4I系统的主体(陆军部,2005c)。
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). A fully automated fire support system, used at all echelons from the platoon operations center to the corps fire support element. It operates with all existing and planned U.S. fire support systems as well as allied field artillery C3 systems.
         高级野战炮兵战术数据系统(AFATDS):一个完全自动化的火力支援系统,适用于从排行动中心乃至兵团火力支援群各个层次。与所有现有的和计划的美军火力支援系统协同使用,同样用于联合野战炮兵C3系统。
All Source Analysis System (ASAS). Provides enemy situation awareness and sensor feeds (unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar system); receives and displays imagery from national, theater, and tactical sources; and analysis tool assists in collection management and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) functions.
         全资源分析系统(ASAS):提供敌军态势分析和传感器监测(无人机、联合监视目标攻击雷达系统);接收和展示全国、战区和战术资源图像;协助收集管理和战场情报准备功能的分析工具。
Global Information Grid (GIG). The networked, shared Joint information system spanning strategic, operational, and tactical information spheres (infosphere) that includes the Defense Information System Network managed secret and non-secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET and NIPRNET respectively), satellite, and radio broadcast media used to manage, interpret, and pass information. The GIG has been associated with “flattening” command hierarchies due to the tremendous speed by which information flows from source to responsible decision maker.
         全球信息格(GIG):跨越战略、行动和战术信息领域(infosphere)的网络共享的联合信息系统,包括防卫信息系统掌控的涉密或非涉密互联网协议路由网络(分别简称SIPRNET and NIPRNET),卫星和用于管理、说明及传输信息的广播媒体。由于信息从源头到相关决策者超快的流动速度,全球信息格(GIG)与“扁平化”指挥网络日渐相联。
Maneuver Control System (MCS). The proponent system for the commander’s common picture, integrates information horizontally and vertically to provide friendly and enemy unit locations; provides the ability to develop and distribute battle plans and
orders; enabled with collaborative planning tools (conferencing, chat, whiteboard) to allow integration of information horizontally and vertically; is known as the heart of the ABCS System of Systems.
机动控制系统(MCS):为指挥员的公共画面提供支持的系统,综合横向和纵向信息以提供敌我单位的位置;提供发展和分配作战计划和指令的功能;带有协同计划工具(会议、聊天、白板)允许横向和纵向信息整合;被认为是陆军战场指挥系统ABCS超系统的核心。
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). A planning tool that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum COA, and producing a plan or order.
军事决策程序(MDMP):一个建立了任务分析、发展、分析并参照彼此成功原则比较行动方案等一系列规程,选择最佳行动方案,产生计划或指令一系列规程的计划工具。
Network. A System of interlinked systems using common computer language and protocols that allows information sharing.
网络:使用共同计算机语言和协议允许信息共享的众多互联的系统。
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). Tactics are doctrinally based concepts that apply to units in combat and include the order and placement of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy; techniques are the general and detailed methods used by troops and commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically the methods of using equipment and personnel; and procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task (FM 3-90 2001, 1-1).
战术、技能和规程(TTP):战术是一个学术概念,用于战斗单位并包括单位、地域和敌我间的命令和部署关系;技能是指挥员和部队使用的履行指定任务和功能的普遍和具体的方法,特别是调配装备和人员的方法;规程是描述如何完成任务的标准和具体的行动方案。
Scope and Delimitations
The relevance of the MDMP as a doctrinal process coupled with the rapid infusion of integrated ABCS C4ISR systems is critical as information management and decision-making models are examined. If the systems and the process are accepted as requirements to provide the framework from which information managers process and provide recommendations for decision by commanders at operational and tactical levels, the integration of system and process must be defined. Fully understanding every collaborative or integrated application existent in the component systems comprising the
ABCS is beyond the scope of this research. Sample examination of those most widely used or “core” systems can be made in order to adequately describe the environment of information management and the products these valued tools offer to decision making staffs and commanders. Recognizing that a great deal of academic study has been devoted to decision-making processes, most particularly in application to corporate and financial habits, this study can not examine the wide range of business practice decision-making tools available. It will instead focus primarily on those military decision-making tools applied to military problem solving that have been identified as in use or recommended for consideration of use in military professional journals and academic research. Generally, the strategic level of operations will not be included as part of the examination of the MDMP in this research, but will remain relevant as a source and destination of information flowing through ABCS. FM 5-0 does not exclude the strategic level from MDMP functions, but the preponderance of source material discussing either or both MDMP and ABCS is focused on the operational and tactical levels of military operations.
范围和定界
随着一体化陆军战场指挥系统和C4ISR系统的快速注入,由于信息管理和决策模型已得到验证,作为学术程序,军事决策程序MDMP的关联性十分关键。如果这些系统和程序要满足提供信息管理者处理的架构、为行动和战术层面的指挥员提供决心建议的需要的话,就必须定义系统和程序的整合。完全理解组成陆军战场指挥系统ABCS的组件系统中每一处协同或整合的应用是超出本课题范围的。为了充分描述信息管理环境和供决策参谋及指挥员使用的宝贵的工具,需要对那些应用广泛的或者“核心的”系统进行样本验证。鉴于已有大量学术研究致力于决策程序,尤其是在社团和金融领域应用上,本课题不能验证大范围的商业应用决策工具。取而代之地,将主要着眼于那些应用于军事专业期刊和学术研究中考虑推荐使用的解决军事问题的军事决策工具。通常,本课题中MDMP验证不包括军事行动的战略水平,但后者仍将与信息在ABCS中流动的源头和终点保持关联。FM 5-0并未从MDMP功能中排除战略水平,但涉及MDMP和ABCS的原始材料的优势还是着眼于军事行动的战略水平。
Study Limitations
The limit of time is a function of the compressed period of this study. Additionally, the objective of this research is to gather all information and data for consideration from unclassified sources. No requirement for extended research is expected that would incur specific funding, another limited resource, in order to complete the work.
时间局限是本课题压缩的主要因素。另外,基于未分类资源的考虑,本研究的目的在于收集所有信息和数据。未能扩展研究的原因在于那将引起用于完成工作的明确的开销和其他受限资源。
Limiting the pool of available data sources to published doctrinal works, technological manuals specific to systems, research theses, and professional journals and
studies narrows the scope of the project as well as providing focus on the subject matter at hand. Another limitation of the subject is the inherent application to only military products and processes. Additionally, this study does not intend to validate or refute the system processes as defined by proponent developers.
    可用的数据来源局限于已出版的学术著作、系统专门的技术手册,研究论文和专业研究期刊,并且仅着眼于手指已有的主题使得课题范围变得狭窄。课题的另一个局限在于固有的应用仅在军事产品和程序中。另外,本课题并不打算证实或者推翻当前系统开发者或支持者的程序。
Technical bulletins and operator’s manuals for ABCS component systems (MCS and AFATDS as examined by this study) specify functions of the system that relate directly to MDMP, although the bias for the bulletins and manuals to reflect doctrinal processes is a result of product and system designers intent on linking the product to processes.
ABCS组件系统(MCS and AFATDS本课题已验证)的技术通报和操作手册详述了与MDMP直接相关的系统功能,即使通报和手册上对学术程序的偏见是产品和系统设计者决定把产品与程序相连的结果。
Finally, the limitation of the researcher’s own biases based on experience and training on the individual ABCS components examined as well as both positive and negative experiences with the doctrinal decision-making processes learned through academic study and practical application may exert some influence over the final recommendations. Identifying the potential for these biases is an attempt to remain cognizant of the potential for bias in an effort to remain true to the academic process.
最后,研究者自身偏见的局限可能会对最终建议造成一些影响。察知这些潜在的偏见并试图保持清醒也是为了忠实于学术程序的真实性。

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请教高手 下面应该怎么翻:
The United States Army Research Laboratory’s Science and Technology Objective Program primary focus is battle command decision making in a digital environment. The Human Research and Engineering Directorate at the United States Army Research Library, comprised of Thomas M. Cook, Dennis K. Leedom, Jock O. Grynovicki, and Michael G. Golden, authored a final report entitled “Cognitive Representations of Battlespace Complexity: Six Fundamental Variables of Combat.” Cook, Leedom, Grynovicki, and Golden associated the six fundamental variables of combat as those associated with the acronym METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and Weather, Time Available, and Civil Considerations). They hypothesized that METT-TC serves as the basis to efficiently organize and represent the dimensions of the battlefield during the MDMP to develop and maintain dominant battlespace knowledge or DBK. The study chose five field grade officers permanently assigned to a United States Army combat unit to document study twenty-four decisions isolated and across three phases of combat operations (delay, defend, attack). The study report cites a vast number of previous works devoted to human processing of information in relation to combat applications, but this is the first and only linkage between METT-TC and MDMP discovered so far. Cook and others, use METT-TC as an analytical model for decision making under the framework of MDMP that is objectively different than other alternative decision-making processes suggested by many of the other sources cited in this research. The METT-TC model explored the “commander-centered decision environment inventory “decision-maker self-report profile” as data collection tools during the study. Correlation between statistical analyses of self-reported emphasis on the importance to decision making experienced by the participants was collated and, in summary, identified  
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the importance of METT-TC in regard to battlefield decision making during the experiment.
Colonel Kevin C. Benson, the current Director of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, SAMS, argues for a digital decision making annex to FM 5-0 in his 2002 Army War College research paper, “Decision Making in the Information Age.” Colonel Benson recognized that the MDMP, a doctrinal deliberate decision-making process, had become a rote sequential tool in application. He identifies the fact that the commander’s increasing access to information from the wide variety of information and data processing systems (the ABCS) generates requirement for information and decision management tools not readily available in the doctrinal MDMP application. Colonel Benson identifies and labels the application of decision making in two distinct genres: “analog” or belonging to the TOC realm of paper maps, large map boards, and rolls of acetate graphics hung over those paper maps; and “digital” or belonging to the TOC populated by ABCS components, projection screens, and digitized maps and graphics transmitted as electrons by a variety of means to higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements in order to maintain a strong COP. Colonel Benson does not argue against the MDMP and the procedures outlined therein for developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action that can be translated into action. Instead, he proposes modification of the process to reflect the capabilities of ABCS components. Colonel Benson seeks a planning process that is collaborative between echelons in order to allow rapid dissemination of the plan and constant updates to the commander’s critical information as that information that is obtained by soldiers and other sensors networked to the COP. The key advantage to achieving a modification to the MDMP that accounts  
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for the digital processes is a profound savings in time over the lock-step process embraced by analog units.
“Force XXI Technology and the Cognitive Approach to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP),” a monograph by Michael C. Sevcik dated 15 May 2000, is similar to the argument put forth by Colonel Benson. Lieutenant Colonel Sevcik argues that information technology holds the key to improving the MDMP and that digitization of the command centers and proliferation of ABCS must include a change in the decision-making process in use. Sevcik understands and recognizes that formal processes are required to make military tactical operating centers functional, but information management and the speed of information flow gives new power to the commander, who can now alter plans at the speed by which he receives and understands new information. Sevcik outlines the history of Force XXI digital battle command evolution, to include realization that some change in decision making must take place in regard to the management of information. Sevcik cites Boyd’s OODA and Captain Robert Bateman’s application of OODA from an Air Force pilot perspective (Boyd’s perspective) to a ground application cycle called RUDE for Receive Understand Disseminate Execute. Earlier than Colonel Benson’s work, Lieutenant Colonel Sevcik’s monograph recognizes the challenges of information processing and decision making, yet also realizes the utility of the MDMP and the potential for a new process to enable leaders to manage the information in a simple, easy to use format similar to Boyd’s OODA loop or RPD Making.
The answers to three questions serve as the genesis of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences May 2003 report, “Training the Troops:  
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What Today’s Soldiers tell us about training for Information Age Digital Competency”: what are good approaches to digital training, what approaches are used in units today, and what do soldiers think about today’s training for tomorrow’s conflicts? The objective of the research conducted by Doctor Brooke B. Schaab and J. Douglas Dressel was to gain insights on best practices for training through soldier interviews of those currently trained and using the Army’s most advanced digital technology. Sixty-two operators of the ABCS answered questionnaires and participated in interviews that sought to answer how best to capitalize on training to meet the demands of the current Army and Army of the future. The sixty-two soldiers answering questions were assigned to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the information-centric digitally enhanced combat team generated by General Shinseki’s move to transform the Army from an “analog” force to a “digital” force, to use the genre terms coined by Colonel Benson. Schaab and Dressel address the training aspect of this digitally enabled unit and its operators who manipulate the ABCS components enabling the information flow into the decision cycle. This interim report is the third in a series of studies by Schaab and Dressel that seeks to document the transition from analog to digital operations. Critical information presented by Schaab and Dressel includes not just the point of view of those who operate the equipment, but inherently presents an understanding of the importance of information to the decision making cycles enabled by digital information flow and network connectivity. Samples of prior experiences with information processing equipment is included, which also identifies a societal or culture shift toward a more digitally adept base from which the military will draw its component operators and first-line information “inputters.”  
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Technical Resources, Training, and TTPs
Captain Timothy S. Jacobsen offers a TTP that weaves the “analog” MDMP and the Army Battle Command digital systems processes together. His solutions offered in his article “The Military Decision-Making Process: Integrating Analog and Digital TTPs” from the January-February 2002 Armor magazine seek integration of process and product through shared information in a spreadsheet format. Captain Jacobsen realizes the importance the MDMP serves as a decision-making process that serves to focus the staff and he seeks exploitation of those ABCS tools available to the staff. The solutions offered in this article include parsing the MDMP into time-managed sections in order to provide a stable framework that various battlefield operating systems can use to maintain a synchronous, focused effort toward orders production. Captain Jacobsen does not explore alternatives to the MDMP, but instead utilizes the MDMP as the core process to integrate the digital systems and products available to the unit from which he belongs, the digitized 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas. Captain Jacobsen is a strong proponent of maximizing the capabilities of each resident ABCS component and presents a position well acquainted with the MDMP as outlined in FM 101-5, the base document that culminates as the 20 January 2005 approved FM 5-0.
Major Michael R. McCaffrey’s “Command and Control Systems: Outlooks for a Digitized Future,” 1 June 2001 MMAS thesis is a monument to the history and evolution of command and control systems. McCaffrey, in detail, outlines the need for command and control based on historical evidence, then transitions and relates all issues regarding command and control to the Force XXI experimental units at Fort Hood, Texas. As with many other researchers, Major McCaffrey identifies the challenge of information  
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management and decision making with regard to the proliferate digitization of the command centers and fighting platforms, but he also identifies a “flattening” of the command structure that had been historically one of the hallmarks of military organizations. The advent of technology and the unregulated access to information that drives decision making, more and more senior commanders can more rapidly make decisions that are influential many echelons below their historic range. McCaffrey associates the military flattening to the economic and commercial application in the civil sector, but his point is absolutely valid in that he identifies how the nature of battle command changes once decision making at the lowest tactical levels is made by senior, and therefore inherently more experienced, commanders disturbs the hierarchy. While not bearing directly on this research, the identification of this aspect of digitization is a factor in the transition from a division and corps based command structure to one based on modular brigades now underway across the Army. The result of information processing superiority is the removal of command echelons no longer valid in the decision-making cycle.
Consulted but not used in this study is the Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems July 2003 final report “Exploiting FBCB2 Capabilities Through Realistic Feedback,” by Bruce C. Leibrecht, Karen J. Lockaby, and Larry L. Meliza. The report focuses on the FBCB2 component of the ABCS system of systems and the specific operations of that component system. This study does not address the FBCB2, therefore, it does not apply toward answering the primary or secondary research questions, but would serve to provide others interested in the FBCB2 component some base line  
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information regarding the system and the attitudes toward using the capabilities inherent to the system.
The AFATDS version 6.3.2 (six-dot-three-dot-two in vernacular) online instruction module is found at http://sill-[url]www.army.mil/USMC/MCFSS/WBT/[/url] afatds632.htm. This source is in addition to the Command and General Staff College AFATDS course A368 instructional material. Through both sources, the AFATDS and MDMP related processes are defined, which includes attack analysis, fire support planning, COA development, plan rehearsals, and force ratio calculators that contribute to the decision-making process of deliberate planning. Additionally, AFATDS possesses the capability to process target or plan analysis without issuing orders, allowing operators to rehearse or run a simulated plan without transmitting operational data to superior, subordinate, or adjacent units (AFATDS information also found at the United States Army Training and Doctrine System Manager Field Artillery Tactical Data System homepage, http://www.army.mil /tsm_fatds/ verified 7 June 2005).
Similarly, the MCS operators manuals and training packages derived from the Digital Leader Development Course component of Command and General Staff College’s Tactics Department includes defining MCS as giving “commanders and staffs the ability to collect, coordinate, and act on near real-time battlefield information and to graphically visualize the battlefield” (Department of the Army 2004a). MCS is the tool that translates staff actions that include full planning operations using MDMP steps to produce a standard order and annexes from common templates in the “Plan Manager” function of the MCS program. Possibly the most important function of MCS is the collaborative planning process outlined in the instruction manuals and the introductory  
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CD-ROM. In practical application, the collaborative tools allow decision making commanders and staffs to share information over a common network to perform any number of the MDMP planning steps over great distances as long as the network connectivity remains intact (Department of the Army 2004a).
The Lockheed Martin Information Systems final report, “Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below White Paper for Future Improvements for the Force XXI,” dated 7 February 1997 provides, first, a historical snapshot of the technical architecture leading to the current state of ABCS networks, and second, it provides many of the definition of terms regarding operations in the digital echelon. This White Paper is an early look at the development of the ABCS training models continuing to evolve into a sustainable, functioning package designed to accommodate the soldier and the needs of the Army. Useful as a basic reference, it does not provide source information that answers specific research questions of this study.
The final report from the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences titled “How Formal Training Affects Soldier Attitudes And Behaviors Towards Digitization,” by John S. Barnett measured how “formal training affects soldier patterns of behavior and attitudes toward digitization based on a formal survey of junior enlisted and non-commissioned officers attending FBCB2 digital system training at Fort Hood, Texas. Results showed soldiers generally feel FBCB2 is useful and worth the additional (training) effort required to learn the systems. It also indicated that formal training in digital systems has a significant positive effect on (a) soldier’s attitudes and behaviors toward digital systems. The results also seem to indicate that training may help soldiers avoid maladaptive behavior patterns that have been identified in other areas.  
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Behaviors such as disuse or over reliance on automated systems, a significant problem in other areas, were relatively rare in soldiers attending formal training” (Barnett 2004, i). This source provides the information requisite to understand the trend to rely on automated processes vice doctrinal “analog” processes as defined by Colonel Benson’s 2002 Army War College report.
“Soldier-Machine Interface For The Army Future Combat System: Literature Review, Requirements, and Emerging Design Principles,” by John E. Morrison, Stephen H. Konya, Jozsef A. Toth, Susan S. Turnbaugh, Karl J. Gunzelman, and Richard D. Gilson from the Institute for Defense Analyses provides a great deal of information regarding the next step to the ABCS in the form of the Future Combat System currently under design. Addressing the fact that much goes into the development of the hardware and software that define a program, this study looks at how the designs account for the manner in which the user, in this case a soldier, interfaces with the systems. Another great resource for defining terms such as “network centric warfare,” this source does not provide information to answer the primary or secondary research questions, but was examined as part of the research.
Major D. Alan Morgan asks “Using Current Command and Control Systems, is it Possible to Use Sensors to Provide a Near-Perfect Logistics Combat Power Estimate to Army Brigade Commanders,” in his June 2003 master’s thesis from the United States Army Command and General Staff College. To answer his research question, Major Morgan explores the ABCS systems contributing to the commander’s COP, but strictly from the logistical operations point of view. Many of the same challenges in information management and introduction to the MDMP process exist in Major Morgan’s research;  
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however, he focuses primarily on the logistic functions and the limited development of logistic systems integrating into ABCS architecture. Without the relevant knowledge provided from the logistic operations forum, commanders and staffs run the risk of making ill-informed decisions that place greater risk on the shoulders of the penultimate executors of deliberate planning, soldiers and leaders charged with implementing a commander’s guidance. Major Morgan’s work does not directly answer the primary or secondary research questions of this study, but instead provides a parallel background to the general dilemma of digital battle command and the efficacy of the process when compared to the MDMP requirements.
“Incorporating AI into Military Decision Making: An Experiment” by Robert Rasch, Alexander Kott, and Kenneth D. Forbus, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Intelligent Systems, July/August 2003, available online at http://www.computer.org/intelligent, hard copy article acquired through the Combined Arms Research Library interlibrary loan, abstract available at http://csdl.computer.org/ comp/mags/ex/2003/04/x4018abs.htm. This article discusses an experiment introducing artificial intelligence into the MDMP as a means to gain detailed analysis while simultaneously gaining efficiency in time. Again, as in previously cited works, the focus of this experiment is toward a reduction in the processing time and conduct of the doctrinal MDMP. Although the target audience of this article is electrical and electronic engineers interested in the technical challenge of creating an artificial intelligence based decision-making process, the standard for comparison remains the doctrinal MDMP. The same issues regarding time and application of the process within time constraints generates the targeted solution to gain savings in time while retaining the detailed result of the deliberate decision-making process.
Finally, understanding the technical report and message formats of digital systems can be derived from FM 101-5-2, US Army Report and Message Formats, date pending. It is the capstone manual for standardized report and message formats that serves both soldiers and the ABCS system component developers and designers. FM 101-5-2 is the single source standard by which interoperability of component systems achieve network compatibility. FM 101-5-2 is necessary only due to the Army’s previously decentralized hardware and software development that brought a plethora of functionally specific systems into the Army inventory by visionary leaders who recognized a need to automate processes of which they had developmental oversight. It is no longer acceptable to develop stand-alone systems; each system developed by the Army must be connected to the ABCS system and the backbone component, MCS, in order to give the commander the most accurate and relevant COP. FM 101-5-2 provides the basis and parameters for those standardized message formats that lead to true interoperability and avoids the legacy of proprietary rights by software or hardware developers.
In conclusion, the list of available resources to conduct this study covers a wide array of options for research. The following chapter will assemble the analytical commentary provided to show the relevance of the literature available for review as it pertains to answering the primary and secondary questions.

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美军的指挥自动化系统又称之为C4ISR系统。C4ISR系统意思是集指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报、监视、侦察于一体的系统。这里说到的指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报、监视、侦察只是针对于功能而言。

在实际部署时,美陆军的指挥自动化系统就是陆军作战指挥系统(ABCS)。

美陆军的ABCS系统由陆军战术指挥控制系统(ATCCS)、陆军全球指控系统(AGCCS)、旅及旅以下战斗系统(FBCB2-BFT)、单兵系统四部分组成。

美军的陆军全球指控系统(AGCCS)包含战略战区指挥控制系统(STCCS)、陆军全球军事指挥控制信息系统(AWIS)、军以上部队战斗勤务支援控制系统。

作为美军的师、旅级作战部队最关注的系统是陆军战术指挥控制系统(ATCCS)、旅及旅以下战斗系统(FBCB2-BFT)、单兵系统。

陆军战术指挥控制系统(ATCCS)由五部分组成,分别是机动控制系统(MCS)、全源情报分析系统(ASAS)、阿法兹野战炮兵数据系统(AFATDS)、前方地域防空系统(FAADC3I)、战勤支援控制系统(CSSCS)

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我不知道你想问的问题是什么,不知是否帮助到

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我想请教哪个高手帮忙译一下上面这部分内容。不胜感激!!!

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可找诺方定制

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版主什么意思?

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