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美军公布了关于赛博作战新的framework

本帖最后由 幻客 于 2012-6-9 00:07 编辑

Joint Staff Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control Concept of Operations。这个刚公布的赛博作战政策规划,如果能搞到原版文件就好了。
6个战区司令部增加了联合赛博中心(JCC)这个新单位,用来协调战区司令部与美国赛博司令部派遣到战区司令部的工作队伍-赛博支援单元(CSE)之间的关系,执掌所在联合司令部的赛博进攻与防御使命。美国北方司令部将率先组建JCC,在向其他战区推广。而首支CSE已在美国中央司令部开始工作,第二支CSE正在美国太平洋司令部完成筹建工作。

落到实处了..........

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美国赛博司令部派遣到各战区联合司令部的赛博支援单元(CSE)是不是模仿于陆军第1空间旅派遣到战区联合司令部的空间支援单元(SSE)?起名就相似,编制也类似是技术专业人士组成的工作队。

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参见这个文章:空天力量杂志中文版,2011夏季刊,“借鉴其他领域经验:建设网空兵力编制和指控控制结构”

网络司令部对联合作战司令部的支援问题本质上是关于美军军事网络力量的定位问题。从2009年开始,美军在战略司令部与四个军兵种之间已经完成了全面的战略调整,形成统一的指挥机制。这种机制可以用两句话总结:一是网络空间建设(国防部国防信息系统局)与网络空间作战(网络进攻和网络防御)相分离;二是网络空间作战与网络空间情报相结合。但这也只是解决了网络力量建设的问题,而没有解决网络力量向联合作战提供能力支援的问题。美军在这个方面有三种模式可以借鉴: 一是航天作战对联合作战的支援方式——航天作战协调员模式。这种模式最大的好处是解决了网络空间作战自身的整体性和独立性的问题,但联合作战对网络作战的依赖性太大,自身不能没有自身的指挥机制和内建部队;第二种是战略运输司令部模式——空中机动主任的模式。这种模式的好处是联合作战司令部开始有自己的网络力量,可以与联合作战更好的无缝连接,但此时仍需要网络司令部网络作战中心的全球化支援,自身尚无完整C2;第三种是特种作战司令部所采用的联合特种作战职能组成司令部的模式。在联合司令部所属辖区内组建联合网络作战职能组成司令部,形成两层的网络力量对联合作战自身的C2机制。所有三种模式是美军在汲取以往经验教训的基础上形成,具有相当的科学性。但根本的问题是网络空间作战的地位问题:它是依附于传统战争还是独立于传统战争。以上的三种模式都具有作战支援配属性,其作战样式依附于传统战争样式,并在其中穿插。

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这个不能打死敌人  有什么实际意义吗

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这个不能打死敌人  有什么实际意义吗
美国及其盟国 发表于 2012-6-9 00:54



    冷兵器时代思维,呵呵。

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赛博战是可以致命的。举个例子,核电厂被瘫痪造成释放发射性物质达到INES7级标准,也就是切尔诺贝儿或者福岛核电厂事件级别的,可能会直接间接造成人员伤亡。

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赛博战是可以致命的。举个例子,核电厂被瘫痪造成释放发射性物质达到INES7级标准,也就是切尔诺贝儿或者福岛 ...
幻客 发表于 2012-6-9 03:02



      现在的赛博战感觉就是小打小闹 每年编列的预算也很少

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Joint Staff Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control Concept of Operations--联合参谋部《网络空间作战指挥与控制过渡性作战概念》,这个是联合出版物(JP)的方式吗?还是做为联合参谋部的指令文件?

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回复 4# 诺方


    从2009年开始,美军在战略司令部与四个军兵种之间已经完成了全面的战略调整,形成统一的指挥机制。这种机制可以用两句话总结:一是网络空间建设(国防部国防信息系统局)与网络空间作战(网络进攻和网络防御)相分离;二是网络空间作战与网络空间情报相结合。

       请教:网络空间情报的概念?美军网络空间情报搜集机构?及其与美其他情报机构的关系?

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回复 10# @carrotmama


   

美国情报系统

估计的网络能力

目前网络角色

未来网络角色

国家安全局(NSA

4.1

5.0

5.0

中央情报局

4.0

3.9

4.6

空军情报、监视和侦察局

4.0

3.0

4.0

国防情报局

4.0

3.5

4.2

国家情报总监

4.0

3.9

4.6

陆军军事情报局

3.9

3.0

3.5

海军情报办公室

3.8

3.0

3.0

联邦调查局

3.8

3.5

4.5

陆战队情报活动处(MCIA

3.7

2.0

3.0

情报和反情报办公室

3.7

3.0

3.5

情报分析办公室

3.6

3.0

3.5

情报与研究局

3.6

3.0

3.5

财政部恐怖主义与金融情报办公室

3.5

3.0

3.0

国家地理情报局

3.0

2.0

3.0

国家侦察办公室

3.0

2.0

3.0

海岸警卫队情报处

3.0

2.5

3.0

毒品执法管理局

2.0

2.0

3.0

1 网络情报(cyber Intelligence)能力



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2008年10月,国家情报主任办公室、国会和情报机构正式建立了业务改革办公室(BTO)来综合利用人员、程序和技术将情报机构改革成为一个综合及简化的情报体系。情报机构网络集成指导小组(NISG)建立了情报机构联合网络(ICFN)计划,目的是建立一个持久的结构和方法来更加经济、完善和安全地让情报机构各部门进行互联。情报机构联合网络(ICFN)计划利用现有网络结构来创建情报机构部门内部和彼此之间的互联模式,这种模式可以达到以下效果:
        因特网行动中心协作;
        施行因特网协议和名称注册;
        为互联的情报机构部门制定网络互联和实施标准;
        施行情报机构整体带宽和容量管理程序。

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回复 9# 诺方


    以指令的形式吧。来源如下:
Panetta Green Lights First Cyber Operations Plan
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120606/DEFREG02/306060010/Panetta-Green-Lights-First-Cyber-Operations-PlanJun. 6, 2012 - 06:44PM   By ZACHARY FRYER-BIGGS

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has approved a new organizational framework, a plan designed as a “first step” towards standardized cyber operations, according to documents obtained by Defense News.
The framework outlines a command structure that places more authority for both offensive and defensive operations under the geographic combatant commanders and creates Joint Cyber Centers (JCC) to serve as a link between combatant commanders and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) Combat Support Elements that will provide intelligence information and operational know-how.
In a memorandum marked “For Official Use Only” dated May 1, Panetta authorized the implementation of the transitional framework, called the Joint Staff Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control Concept of Operations, and directed the secretaries of the military departments, chiefs of the military services, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, CYBERCOM commander, and Department of Defense chief information officer among others, to act with haste.
“It is imperative that we move quickly and put the transitional framework in place as soon as possible,” he said.
The framework itself describes a present security situation in dire need of action. “The speed and intensity with which adversaries could exploit vulnerabilities in the DoD Global Information Grid jeopardizes the Department’s ability to execute successful military operations,” it says.
To combat the problem and provide greater offensive capability, the new organizational structure includes standing up a JCC at each geographic combatant command by June 2012, designed to serve as the “nexus for combatant command cyberspace enterprise.” The JCC will organize both offensive operations as well as protecting the networks employed by each combatant command, combining disparate responsibilities not previously concentrated locally. Each JCC is set to be composed of existing cyber personnel at each command, although experts expressed skepticism that this combination could result in sufficient staffing. U.S. Northern Command announced that it had stood up its own JCC May 22 without specifying the details of the larger plan, although a DoD spokesman said information on the implementation of the plan and the creation of other JCCs was not immediately available.
The framework also includes standing up a CYBERCOM staffed combat support element at each geographic command. The two would work together to complete cyber tasks, with the CSE providing a link back to CYBERCOM and its collection of talent and intelligence.
“The JCC and CSE, collocated at each Combatant Command, will work toward the common goal of effective and efficient planning, allocation, and synchronization of cyber effects in three cyberspace LOOs (Lines of Operation) with the Combatant Commander’s campaign plans and operations while maximizing unity effort,” it says.
Experts voiced concern at the implementation of the plan, citing staffing issues, budget issues, and a general lack of specific mechanics. “A bunch of intel dorks wrote this not understanding how people interact or how things work,” a former intelligence officer said.
The document outlining the framework, also labeled for restricted circulation, attempts to strike a careful balance between the increase of capability and authority at the geographic combatant commands, and the continued concentration of cyber capabilities at CYBERCOM. Historically, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been the home of most cyber operational capabilities, and only with the creation of CYBERCOM, which reached full operational capability in late 2010, have many of those capabilities begun to gain greater exposure outside of the intelligence community. Still, many capabilities remain beyond the reach of combatant commanders, an issue meant to be rectified by the new plan.
While CYBERCOM will be assisting the combatant commands by staffing combat support elements, the creation of the JCCs adds a localized capability not previously present. Experts said that finding suitable personnel would be an issue as talent is scarce and the expanded need for capable personnel does not include funding. Much of the military’s cyber talent resides at Ft. Meade and CYBERCOM, meaning that many operations might best be carried out from a centralized location instead of at the combatant commands.
“Some cyberspace operations can be contained within an AOR [Area of Responsibility] and are of immediate interest to a specific GCC [Geographic Combatant Command] and its components; however, most cyberspace operations have the potential to cause simultaneous effects at the global, theater, and local levels that make them transregional in nature and of interest to a broader community,” the framework says. “Given this complex interrelationship, providing all cyber support forward in the GCCs is neither feasible nor desirable. Many cyber capabilities can be provided through, and in some cases only through, reachback.”
The document does, however, maintain the need for forward capability. “At the same time, GCCs must be able to operate and defend tactical and constructed networks or be assured their critical networks are operated and defended, and synchronize cyber activities related to accomplishing their operational objectives.”
Panetta, seemingly anticipating concerns about resources and staffing, emphasized the need for quick action regardless of resource limitations in his memorandum.
“Although I expect you may find that you need additional resources to implement a complete and enduring C2 (command and control) framework within your commands, speed is important,” he said.
Experts also voiced concern about the lack of specifics on how the new JCCs and CSEs would interact and the fact that neither the Department of State nor Department of Homeland Security were included. “Nowhere is state mentioned,” an industry source said. “At some point you need to provide them with some optics.”
The transitional strategy, the outline of which was initially agreed upon in a January 30 Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank meeting, does not specify when the CSEs are set to be stood up, although U.S. Central Command’s CYBERCOM CSE is already fully operational and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is in the process of standing up its own capability. The framework leaves the timeline for other CSEs open depending on available resources. The CSE at PACOM has been the subject of a good deal of bickering, a source said, as the CSE ultimately answers to CYBERCOM, frustrating staff at the combatant command.
But the fact that subject experts from CYBERCOM and the combatant commands will be interacting in the new plan with a designated JCC, as opposed to commanders interacting who may not have technical knowledge, could make the new structure better at producing results. “What’s huge is that I’ve now got an operator telling other operators what to do, as opposed to relying on a bunch of intelligence guys,” another industry source said.
Although there have been efforts within the military command structure to reconsider operations in cyberspace, the fact that this new framework was authorized by the Secretary of Defense means that the issue is being taken seriously, the source said. “It’s interesting in that this is coming from civilian leadership, not CYBERCOM,” the source said.
The development of the framework was mentioned by Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon in March testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, although she mentioned the framework along with the development of standing rules of engagement in the same breath.
“The department is currently conducting a thorough review of the existing rules of engagement for cyberspace,” she said. “We are working closely with the joint staff on the implementation of a transitional command and control model for cyberspace operations. This interim framework will standardize existing organizational structures and command relationships across the department for the application of the full spectrum of cyberspace capabilities.”
The framework does not address any of the questions surrounding the legality of a variety of cyber activities, and does not settle the fierce debate over rules of engagement. That debate centers on the division of responsibilities between combatant commands, the intelligence community, and DHS, and has been brewing for years.
A final framework, based on lessons learned from the new transitional plan, is set to be mapped out within the year, the document said.

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能搞到原版,减缩版的文件也不错哦

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极度需要

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我也想看看哦,现在论坛里还有哪位大哥能进美军那些需要身份注册的网站啊,多搞点资料贴出来。

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差距是越来越大了,PLA刚组建了航母舰载机部队,人家无人机已经从航母能智能起飞了……
AMCLUB

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回复 17# SNAKE


    话不能这样讲,一步一步来嘛!

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